Demand Uncertainty:Exporting Delays and Exporting Failures by Nguyen, Daniel Xuyen
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Demand Uncertainty
Nguyen, Daniel Xuyen
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Nguyen, D. X. (2010). Demand Uncertainty: Exporting Delays and Exporting Failures. Department of Economics,
University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
Discussion Papers 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel.: +45 35 32 30 01 – Fax: +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1601-2461 (E) 
 
No. 10-17 
 
 
 
Demand Uncertainty:  
Exporting Delays and Exporting Failures 
 
 
 
Daniel X. Nguyen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Demand Uncertainty: Exporting Delays and
Exporting Failures
Daniel X. Nguyeny
University of Copenhagen
May 2010
Abstract
This paper presents a model of trade that explains why rms wait to export
and why many exporters fail. Firms face uncertain demands that are only realized
after the rm enters the destination. The model retools the timing of uncertainty
resolution found in productivity heterogeneity models. This retooling addresses sev-
eral shortcomings. First, the imperfect correlation of demands reconciles the sales
variation observed in and across destinations. Second, since demands for the rms
output are correlated across destinations, a rm can use previously realized demands
to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations. The option to forecast de-
mands causes rms to delay exporting in order to gather more information about
foreign demand. Third, since uncertainty is resolved after entry, many rms enter
a destination and then exit after learning that they cannot prot. This prediction
reconciles the high rate of exit seen in the rst years of exporting. Finally, when
faced with multiple countries in which to export, some rms will choose to sequen-
tially export in order to slowly learn more about its chances for success in untested
markets.
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rm heterogeneity, exporting, trade failures, trade delay
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1 Introduction
Productivity heterogeneity models of international trade have gained some traction in
recent years1. Inspired by empirical works documenting the di¤erences between rms
that do and do not export, models such as Melitz (2003) plausibly explain why only a
fraction of rms export2. In these models, high xed and variable costs of exporting
prevent all but the most productive rms from exporting. This self-selection mechanism
has empirical support over other explanations for rm exporting, such as learning-by-
exporting.3
However, productivity heterogeneity models cannot reconcile several recently uncov-
ered facts. For instance, productivity heterogeneity cannot fully explain the variation of
rms sales within a destination. Since productivity is anchored to the rm and translates
monotonically to rm sales, these models predict that variation in productivities for a
set of rms selling to a destination should fully explain the variation in sales for that set.
Recent works have found that rm-specic variation accounts for less than a third of total
sales variation.4
Since productivities in Melitz (2003) are realized before the rm supplies to any des-
tination, a rm that begins exporting should export immediately to all destinations and
forever. This prediction is inconsistent with evidence that most rms delay entry into ex-
porting5, and that many rms stop exporting almost immediately after they begin.6. As
Figure 1 shows, over a third of Colombian rm that exported in the 1980s stopped after
only one year, and that the exporting hazard rate decreases with time length of export-
ing7. Melitz (2003) is also inconsistent with the pattern of export expansion of Colombian
1Notable examples include Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003),
Melitz (2003), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007).
2Notable works include Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) and
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998).
3See survey by Greenaway and Kneller (2007)
4See Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz (2008), Lawless and Whelan (2008), and Munch and Nguyen (2008)
5Damijan, Kostevc, and Polanec (2006) nd that Slovenian rms supply domestically for two to four
years before they start exporting.
6Eaton, Enslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007) nd that nearly half of Colombian rms who started
exporting in 1997 stopped the following year.
7Colombian rm data statistics calculated by author from dataset generously provided by Jim Tybout.
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rms, in which rms slowly expand the set of destinations to which they export.8
Insert Figure 1 here
To reconcile these patterns, I introduce a model of trade akin to Melitz (2003) with
two novel contributions. The rst is that I allow for imperfect correlation of rm hetero-
geneity across destinations. I do this by interpreting the heterogeneity in demand space:
rms face rm-destination specic perceived quality draws. In Melitz (2003), a model
where the heterogeneity is perfectly correlated across destinations, rms enter all prof-
itable markets simultaneously. In this new model, rms use realized demands in supplied
destinations to forecast demands in unsupplied destinations. In a free entry equilibirium,
the ability to forecast demands causes rms to delay exporting in order to gather more
information about foreign demand. This feature of the model reconciles the observed
delays in exporting (Damijan, Kostevc, and Polanec 2006). In a multi-country setting,
this forecasting ability results in some rms slowly adding countries to their set of export-
ing destinations, reconciling the pattern of sequential export expansion (Eaton, Enslava,
Kugler, and Tybout 2007).
The second di¤erence between this model and Melitz (2003) is the uncertainty resolu-
tion timing. A rm in Melitz (2003) realizes its productivity before any supply decisions
are made; the rm perfectly forecasts prots as soon as it is born. Those rms that "fail"
in Melitz never supply to any destination; they are not rms that we can see in the sales
data. The current model moves the resolution timing until after the rm enters the desti-
nation. This results in some rms garnering negative prots. Demands are time-invariant
so once the rm supplies to the destination once, it can forecast prots in that market
forever. Those who garner negative prots exit the destination the following period. I
term an exit after a single period a Failure. If the destination is a foreign country, I term
it an Exporting Failure. This feature of the model reconciles the high initial exporting
failures seen in Figure 1.
See Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) for data details.
8See Eaton, Enslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2007)
3
Marketing research points to demand uncertainty as the driver of failures. Table 1
summarizes the results of marketing studies of product failures. Only one of the eight
studies points to unexpected high cost as a cause of failures while all of them attribute
failures to over-optimistic forecasts of market demand9.
Table 1: Reasons for New Product Failures
Study
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Unexpected high cost X
Value to potential buyers was overestimated X X X X X X X X
Poor planning X X X X X X
Timing Wrong X X X X X
Enthusiasm crowded on facts X X X X X
Product failed X X X
Product lacked a Champion X
Company politics X
1.Abrams (1974), 2.Angelus (1969), 3.Booz, Allen, & Hamilton (1968), 4.Constandse (1971),
5.Diehl (1972), 6.Hopkins & Bailey (1971), 7.MacDonald (1967), 8.Miles (1974)
Reproduced from Crawford (1977)
Other papers have overcome the imperfect correlation of sales variation across desti-
nations by layering additional sources of rm-destination-specic heterogeneity on top of
the rm-specic productivity heterogeneity10 or by layering both quality and productivity
heterogeneity together11. This model is able to reconcile this pattern with a single source
of heterogeneity.
The Melitz (2003) model cannot explain the exporting delays and exporting failures
present in literature. Recent studies12 have modeled delays and failures by adding time-
varying productivity shocks. Firms experiencing these shocks oscillate back and forth
9Marketing studies lament the persistence of high failure rates in light of 75 years of marketing ad-
vances. The rm can spend an exorbant amount of money forecasting market demand only to produce
a product that the market ultimately rejects. Recent examples include new Coke and HD-DVD. This
points towards a mechanism of failure that cannot be overcome by increasing advertising or other xed
costs.
10See for example Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), and Das, Roberts,
and Tybout (2007).
11e.g. Hallak and Svidasan (2008), and Benedetti Fasil and Borota (2010).
12See Luttmer (2004), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2005)
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across the exporting productivity cuto¤. These rms start and stop exporting based on
the direction of the exogenous shock. The time-varying productivity channel certainly
explains some of the patterns described above, but has some shortcomings. The channel
is one of exogenous shocks, so extracting implications from those models are more di¢ -
cult. This paper suggests an orthogonal mechanism by which rms decide delay and stop
exporting13. In addition, time-varying productivity cannot reconcile why some exporters
are less productive than nonexporters, which this paper can.
Instead of varying rm heterogeneity across time, this paper varies it across desti-
nations. Exporting failures arise, not from exogenous shocks, but because rms do not
know whether they can succeed in a destination before it is actually in that destination.
Exporting delays occur, not because rms are waiting for exogenous shocks, but because
a zero prot general equilibrium prevents a new rm from supplying both home and for-
eign destinations immediately. It has to choose one destination. By delaying, the rm
learns more about itself before deciding whether to export. In a multicountry setting, this
learning process enables some rms to supply to single additional destination, in order to
learn more about themselves before expanding further.
One additional contribution of the model is the ability to reconcile the existence of
export-only rms, which are rms that export all of their output. Approximately one
percent of American rms in 1987 and ve percent of Colombian rms in the 1980s were
export-only rms14. The model shows how this can occur in the cases of both symmetric
and asymmetric countries.
The following section presents the structure of the model. It describes an overview
of the economy, and decribes the supply decisions rms must make each period. I then
restrict the model to two countries in Section 3. I show the general equilibrium testing
strategies of rms in a simple symmetric case, and present numerical results. I then
extend the base model to a more general assymetric two country case and a multiple
13There can be other explanations of exporting delay, e.g. nancial constraints by Bellone, Musso,
Nesta, & Sahiavo (2010).
14For American rms, see Figure 1 in Bernard and Jensen (1995). Columbian rm statistics calculated
by author from dataset generously provided by Jim Tybout.
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symmetric country case. The assymetric country case shows that when one country is
much larger than the other, rms will rather sell to the larger market rst. The multiple
symmetric country case shows that some rms will export to a subset of available untested
destinations, instead of all available destinations, even if those destinations are ex ante
identical.
2 Model Structure
The model is an extension of Krugmans (1980) model of trade in varieties and most re-
sembles Melitz (2003). In Melitz (2003), single-variety rms are di¤erentiated by marginal
costs of production. These costs are perfectly correlated across destinations and resolved
before supply decisions are made. In the current model, rms are di¤erentiated by de-
mand shifters. The shifters are imperfectly correlated across destinations and resolved
after initial supply decisions are made. These two changes lead to a richer story of how
rms decide when and where to sell.
The world consists J countries and an innite horizon of discrete time periods t.
Consumers in each country j 2 (1; :::; J) consume both a homogenous good and a dif-
ferentiated good. The homogenous good is produced with a constant returns to scale
production technology and traded freely. This equalizes wages across countries, which we
normalize to one. We focus the rest of the exposition on the di¤erentiated good. In every
country, there is a potentially limitless number of rms that produce unique varieties of
the di¤erentiated good to sell in one or more destinations15. Time-invariant preferences
for the di¤erentiated good can be represented by the utility function uj :
uj(fqj!tg!2
jt) =
Z
!2
jt
exp

Xj!


(qj!t)
 1
 d!
where qj!t is the quantity of variety ! consumed in j at time t;  > 1 is a measure
of the elasticity of substitution between these varieties, and Xj! is a random variable
15This is a one-variety-per-rm model, but the number of varieties a rm produces has no bearing on
the model predictions as long as the costs and demands are variety-specic and not rm-specic.
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determining j0s time-invariant perceived quality of !: Xj! can also be interpreted as the
appeal, or popularity, of ! in j: Given 
jt, the set of varieties available to consumers in
j at t; destination j0s demand for variety ! can be expressed as
qj!t =
p j!tYjt
jt
exp(Xj!) (1a)
jt =
Z
!2
jt
exp(Xj!)p
1 
j!t d! (1b)
where pj! is the destination price of variety !; Yjt is the total expenditure of j on 
jt;
and jt is the endogenous level of competition in j: jt is large enough to be una¤ected
by a price change of any single variety !: It resembles the inverse of the usual CES price
index.
Firms produce their unique varieties using a production technology that is identical
across varieties. This di¤ers fromMelitz (2003), in which rms produce using idiosyncratic
technologies. The labor cost lijt required to produce qt units of any variety from country
i and supply them to destination j in period t is
lijt =  ijqt + f (2)
That is, there are xed costs f and marginal costs  ij of supply16. The rm must pay
these xed costs for each period t and each destination j to which it supplies. The
destination xed costs represent, for example, storefront rent, xed shipping and port fees,
or advertising costs17. The marginal costs represent, for example, variable production,
transport, and tari¤ costs. All discussed variables except for xj! are known to the rm
owner at all times.
Faced with the production costs (2) and demand (1) ; the owner of a rm ! in country
16In this baseline model, the xed cost is assumed to be constant for the two destinations, while the
marginal costs di¤er. The model has similar export delay/failure predictions if xed costs, instead of
marginal costs, di¤ered across destinations. Both costs a¤ect the cuto¤s in equation 7 similarly.
17This paper considers xed advertising costs to be constant and exogenous, but others have examined
endogenous advertising costs in a partial equilibrium setting (e.g. Arkolakis 2009, Gormsen 2009)
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i sets the price pj!t as a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
pj!t =

   1 ij: (3)
Since the optimal price is the same across all periods and varieties produced in i and
sold in j; I simplify notation by dening pij =  1 ij. This optimal pricing results in the
period t prots of
ijt (Xj!) =
p1 ij Yjt
jt
exp(Xj!)  f (4)
The rm owner observes Xj! only if she supplies ! to j at least once. If Xj! is
known, then ijt (Xj!) is perfectly forecasted for all future periods. If not, the rm owner
must decide whether to supply ! to j based on her beliefs about Xj!: If the distribution
from which Xj! is drawn is degenerate, exp(Xj!) is constant for all varieties and can
be factored out, reducing demand equation (1) to that presented in Krugman (1980),
although destination prot equation 4 stills di¤ers from Krugman (1980) by the  f term.
I examine steady state equilibria in which aggregate market conditions do not change
over time. Therefore, Yjt and jt can be characterized by Yj and j: I drop the t subscript
whereever it is superuous.
2.1 The Distribution of Perceived Qualities
This section discusses the multivariate random vectorX! = (X1!; ::; Xj!; ::XJ!) consisting
of J random variables each corresponding to the perceived quality of ! in a destination.
It is a continuous random vector with a joint multivariate normal pdf18 denote by g ()19.
18This is not a critical assumption for the qualitative results of the model. A normal distribution is used
so that the resultant sales are lognormally distributed. The lognormal distribution more closely matches
rm size patterns in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2004) than the commonly used Pareto distribution. Cabral and Mata (2003) show that rm sizes are
distributed lognormally. Axtell (2001) argues that rm sizes are Pareto distributed, but concedes that
the tails of the distribution are not Pareto. A truncated lognormal may t the data best.
19 for example, g (xj!; xi!) =

2s2
p
1  2
 1
exp

   2s2  1  2 1  x2j!   2xj!xi! + x2i!
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For j 6= k; Xj! and Xk! have the properties
E [Xj!] = E [Xk!] = 0 (5a)
V ar [Xj!] = V ar [Xk!] = s
2 (5b)
Cov (Xj!; Xk!)
s2
=  (5c)
where s2 > 0 is the variance of each of the marginal distributions and 0 <  < 1 is
the correlation coe¢ cient. The restriction on  implies that the demands in any two
destinations are positively and imperfectly correlated.
Using Bayesian updating, I determine how the rm owner forecasts perceived qual-
ities in untested markets. To minimize confusion, I number the destinations so that
rm ! has observed perceived qualities in the rst I destinations. Then the conditional
distribution of any unknown Xj!, given the vector of known perceived qualities ~xI! 
(X1! = x1!; :::; XI! = xI!), is normal with moments20:
E

Xj!j~xI!

= I! =

PI
i=1 xi!
I+ (1  ) (6a)
V AR

Xj!j~xI!

= 2I = s
2

1  I
2
I+ (1  )

: (6b)
Note that if I = 0; the moments in Equation 6 collapse to those in Equation 5.
As the number of known observations I increases, the forecasted perceived quality I!
approaches the sample mean of the observed perceived qualities; the forecast gets closer
to the rm average and away from the prior. Also, as I increases, the conditional variance
2I decreases: the forecast becomes more precise with each observation.
The density of Xj! given ~xI! is completely characterized by a normal distribution with
a mean of I! and variance determined by I: I denote the conditional pdf as gI (jI!) :
In summary, the rm owner has beliefs about her perceived quality in a destination.
These beliefs depend on both the number of destinations previsouly tested, as well as the
20I derive this in Appendix A
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average of perceived qualities observed in those destinations. In each time period, the
rm owner uses these beliefs to make decisions about which destinations to supply.
2.2 Firm Decisions
At the beginning of each period t, the rm owner must decide whether to supply to each
of the j 2 (1; :::; J) destinations, using the information gleaned from having previously
supplied to I of the destinations. These J decisions fall into one of two categories. First,
for each of the I previously tested destinations, the rm owner decides whether to stay
and continue supplying there. Second, for each of the J   I untested destinations, she
decides whether to test her variety there. We examine each of these two sets of decisions.
2.2.1 Decision to Stay
Consider the rm owners decision for a destination j that she supplied to in a period
before t and thus previously realized Xj! = xj!: She will supply ! to j in t if the known
prots ij (xj!) are positive. Rearranging equation (4) shows that ij (xj!) > 0 only if
xj! > x

ij; where
xij = ln
 
fj
p1 ij Yj
!
(7)
If xj! > xij, the rm makes positive prots by supplying ! to j again. I term this the
decision to stay in j; since the rm has previously supplied to j: If xj! < xij, the rm will
not supply ! to j in t or in any period after t: I term this a failure of ! in j: The stay
cuto¤ xij is the minimum perceived quality required by rms in country i to not fail in
destination j:
2.2.2 Decision to Test
If the variety ! has not previously been supplied to j; the rm owner must decide whether
to supply ! to j for the rst time. I term this the decision to test ! in destination j:
The rm owner will test j based on her expectations of the lifetime discounted sum of
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per-period-prots. The prots are discounted because the rm faces an exogenous death
rate of . For a rm from destination i testing destination j with I known perceived
qualities and a forecasted perceived quality of I!, the expected testing prot vijI (I!)
is
vijI (I!) =
Expected testing period protsz }| {
1Z
 1
ij (x) gI (xjI!) dx +
1X
t=1
(1  )t| {z }
Discounted Sum
0B@ 1Z
xij
ij (x) gI (xjI!) dx
1CA
| {z }
Expected future period prots
(8)
and comprises the prots the rm expects in the rst supply period and the discounted
sum of all future expected prots, should the rm realize a favorable perceived quality.
It is easier to work with the expected testing prot by combining Equations 4, 7 and 8 to
produce
vijI (I!) = f
1Z
 1
exp
 
x  xij

gI (xjI!) dx  f
+
(1  )

f
1Z
xij
 
exp
 
x  xij
  1 gI (xjI!) dx: (9)
Equation 9 shows that the endogenous variable xij completely characterizes the ag-
gregate destination market conditions for rm !. The interactions between destination
specic characteristics pij; Yj and j in equations 4 and 7 determine xij:
It is straightforward to show that vijI () increases with  and a unique +ijI < x

ij
exists for each ijI triplet such that the expected testing prot is positive only if  > +ijI
21:
 > +ijI ) vijI () > 0 (10)
21For proof, see Appendix B
:
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I term +ijI the testing cuto¤ . It is the minimum forecasted perceived quality that a
rm from i with I previous observations requires in order to protably test j:
A rm from country i with I previous observations has J supply decisions deter-
mined by the endogenous aggregate state variables represented by the vector iI = 
xij; 
+
ijI

j2f1;:::;Jg : We can combine these state variables for all rms with I observa-
tions into I = (I)i2f1;:::;Jg : Finally, we can combine all state variables for all possible
Is in this economy to produce a vector characterizing this entire economy:
 = (I)I2f0;:::;Jg : (11)
To be clear, in the vector ; i and j denotes specic countries, while I denotes the number
of previously tested countries.
3 Two Symmetric Countries
Now that the structure of the economy has been outlined, I look at how a zero-expected-
lifetime-prot steady-state general equilibrium will a¤ect a new rms testing strategy.
In this section, I examine a world consisting of two symmetric countries H (ome) and
F (oreign). I normalize marginal costs to reect iceberg trade costs between the two
countries:
 ij =  ji =  >  ii = 18j; i 2 fH;Fg ; j 6= i (12)
Due to the structure of these trade costs, the stay cuto¤ for rms exporting to desti-
nation j is greater than the stay cuto¤ those rms located in j and selling domestically:
xij = x

jj + (   1) ln () > xjj (13)
In this symmetric country setup, I show that the zero-expected lifetime prot condition
will induce rms to delay exporting. Later, I show that if one country is much larger than
the other, this will entice all rms in both countries to test the larger one rst.
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3.1 Testing Order
Consider rm ! located in country i 2 fH;Fg at time t; which hasnt tested in either
destination. The rm owner can sequentially or simultaneously the two destinations. She
tests ! following one of three strategies (strategy nomenclature in parenthesis):
1(SB). Test ! in both the Home and Foreign destinations in period t:
2(SH). Test ! in only the Home destination in period t. If xH! > 1
+
HF1; then test the
Foreign destination the following period.
3(SF). Test ! in only the Foreign destination in period t. If xF! > 1
+
FH1; then test the
Home destination the following period.
In a steady state equilibrium, the value of these strategies are determined by the
aggregate state vector  in Equation 11. The value of each strategy can be expressed as
V i (S;) ; S 2 fSB; SH; SFg ; where
V i (SB;) = viH0 (0) + viF0 (0) (14a)
V i (SH;) = viH0 (0) + (1  )
Z 1
1

+iF1
viF1 (x) g0 (x) dx (14b)
V i (SF;) = viF0 (0) + (1  )
Z 1
1

+iH1
viH1 (x) g0 (x) dx (14c)
The second terms in (14b) and (14c) reect the discounted expectation of the value of
testing the second market should the rm owner draw a high enough perceived quality in
the rst destination.
3.1.1 Equilibrium
A zero-expected prot steady-state two-symmetric-countries equilibrium is dened as the
aggregate variable vector ~ and rm testing strategy ~S such that for i = H;F :
1. ~S maximizes maxS V i

S; ~

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2. V i( ~S; ~) = 0
The rst condition states that a new rm will choose the strategy that maximizes its
lifetime expected prots from testing in H and F: The second condition states that this
maximum value must be zero, due to free entry. For the rest of this section, I show this
equilibrium exists and is unique through a series of proofs.
Lemma 1 The destination with the lower stay cuto¤ will have a higher strategy value of
testing there rst. For example, xiF > x

iH ) V i (SF;) < V i (SH;)8:
Proof. See Appendix C.
The probability of success in a destination, which monotonically decreases with the
stay cuto¤, completely determines the expected testing prot in that destination, which in
turn determines the strategy value of testing that destination rst. When comparing the
strategy values of two destinations, we do not have to concern ourselves with di¤erential
trade costs, aggregate expenditures, or the average price competition from other varieties,
as long as we know the stay cuto¤s.
Proposition 2 In an zero-expected-lifetime-prot symmetric equilibrium wheremaxS V i

S; ~

=
0, rms will not test both markets simultaneously: V i (SB;) < 0:
Proof. By construction, vHH1 (x) > 08x > 1+HH1, so (1  )
R1
1

+HH1
vHH1 (z) g (z) dz >
0. Assume by way of contradiction that viF0 (0)  0. Therefore, V i

SF; ~

> 0 so
maxS V
i

S; ~

= 0 is violated. Therefore, viF0 (0) < 0: The symmetric argument applies
for why viH0 (0) < 0: Thus, V i

SB; ~

= viH0 (0) + viF0 (0) < 0:
If the lifetime value of testing a market is nonnegative, the owner would certainly test
that market rst and only test the second market if the resulting conditional lifetime value
of testing the second market is positive. Since zero-expected-lifetime-prot is imposed,
this scenario is non-existent. Firms will not sell to all markets simultaneously.
Proposition 3 In an zero-expected-lifetime-prot symmetric equilibrium wheremaxS V i

S; ~

=
0, rms will not test the export market rst: V H

SF; ~

< 0 and V F

SH; ~

< 0:
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Proof. Since xHF > x

iF and lemma 1, V
H

SF; ~

< V H

SH; ~

. Therefore,
V H

SF; ~

cannot maximize maxS V H

S; ~

; and so V H

SF; ~

< 0: The symmetric
argument applies for V F

SH; ~

< 0:
Firms will not test the overseas export market rst. This is due to the added costs of
exporting, which depresses expected prots. Since from Proposition 2, rms will also not
test both destinations simultaneously, this leaves only one strategy: test ! in the same
destination the rm is located. I term this an exporting delay. My model provides a
channel to explain why rms delay their exporting: since exporting is so risky, rms need
to start in the safer home market to learn about their perceived quality.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique  such that equililbrium is achieved.
Proof. See Appendix D
If V (SH;) > 0; rms will introduce more new varieties. These new varieties will
increase competition and lower the chances of success in both destinations. The values of
testing the destinations will decrease and thus decrease the value of a new variety. This
cycle will occur until the value of a new variety is driven to zero.
The model characterization of the two symmetric country equilibrium is now com-
plete.22 In the steady state equilibrium, new rms arise in each period t. New rms in H
test their varieties in Home in the initial period t. In the next period t+ 1, rm owners
make two parallel decisions. First, they choose to continue supplying protable varieties
to the Home destination. Unprotable varieties fail. Second, rm owners choose whether
to test their varieties in the foreign destination, based on their forecast of perceived qual-
ity in Foreign. In periods t+2 and onwards, rms have all the information they need to
decide to which destination(s) they will supply. Those varieties that were tested in both
markets will be continued to be supplied to where they are protable. This process is
presented in the top half of Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2.
22The equilibrium mass of incoming rms can be determined by clearing the nal goods market.
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For comparison, the process in Melitz (2003) is presented in the bottom half of Figure 2.
Using his notation, rms pay a development cost to observe the productivity '!: Since '!
is known at the beginning of t; decisions for all destinations are made immediately. Firms
with high productivities will supply to both markets. Firms with mediocre productivities
will supply to only the domestic market. Firms with low productivities will not supply at
all - the market never sees these last rms.
3.2 Numerical Predictions
The two-symmetric country case generates predictions consistent with the testing and fail-
ure rates of exporters. However, the normal distribution does not lend itself to closed-form
expressions for these rates. Therefore, I determine equilibrium conditions numerically us-
ing model parameters taken from established empirical studies23. The parameters of the
baseline simulation are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Baseline Model Parameters
Parameter Value
 1.5
 4
 0.7
 0.11
I set  = 1:5 to match typical average trade costs found in the literature (Anderson &
van Wincoop 2004). Hummels (2001) nd  to vary between 2 and 5; I set  = 4: The
hazard rate  baseline was set to match those of US imports at a 10-digit Harmonized
System aggregation (Besedes & Prusa 2006). I choose a baseline value of  = 0:7 but
show that results are robust to the choice of : As seen in equation 9, the xed cost f
can be factored out of all value equations and does not a¤ect the equilibrium cuto¤s, but
23The Matlab Code is available from the author. The numerical integration of the bivariate normal
distribution used 1,000,000 Monte Carlo evaluation points.
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instead scales the economy by determining, along with the labor endowment, the total
number of rms. I use f = 1, but changing f does not change the solutions. I use a
baseline s2 = 2; but this just scales the cuto¤ parameters. As such, I report equilibrium
cuto¤ parameters as multiples of the standard deviation s =
p
s2:
Using only these few parameters, I can compare the results of my model to reported
statistics in recent literature, as summarized in Table 3. I repeat the exercise for  = 1:3;
in case  = 1:5 is an overestimate of trade costs.
Table 3: Baseline results compared to recent empirical ndings
Statistic
Model
Predictions
( = 1:5)
Model
Predictions
( = 1:3)
Observation Source
Percent Exporters 6% 15%
4-18%
21%
BJRS
BEJK
Product Failures 94% 94% 50-80% CMC
Export Failures 90% 89%
50% the rst year
80% the rst four years
BP
Export Only Firms 0% 1.6% 1-5% AU
Percent Exporters: Number of exp orters/Number of rm s
Product Failures: Percentage of rm s that w ithdraw from the domestic market after the rst p eriod
Export Failures: Percentage of rm s that ex it the foreign market after the rst p eriod
Export Only : Percentage of rm s that export but do not sell to the dom estic market.
BJRS: Bernard , Jensen , Redding, Schott, 2007, BEJK : Bernard Eaton , Jensen , Kortum , 2003
CMC: C . M erle C raw ford , 1977, BP : 10-d ig it HS in Besedes & Prusa, 2006a
AU : Author calcu lated , as d iscussed in the introduction
As Table 3 shows, the model matches previous empirical ndings well; each predic-
tion is within the range or near the reported point estimate. Firm-level failure rates as
predicted in the model are higher than product-level failure rates in Besedes & Prusa
(2006a, 2006b). Export Only Firms exist in the model because, for the baseline parame-
ters, 1

+HF1 < x

HH : Some rms draw an xH! such that
1

+HF1 < xH! < x

HH , so they
start exporting even though they fail the domestic market.
Table 3 shows that trade costs a¤ect the number of exporters in equilibrium. To show
the how  a¤ects the equilibrium, I vary  over the range [1:1; 2] : As seen in the right
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two graphs in Figure 3, changing trade costs signicantly a¤ect the rates of rms entering
and exiting the foreign market.
First, we examine the top right graph to see the e¤ects of  on the cuto¤s. Increasing
trade costs increase the stay cuto¤ in the Foreign destination, which then increases the
test cuto¤ a rm needs in order to start exporting. The general equilibrium e¤ect of this
is that fewer rms become and stay exporters. The decrease in import competition helps
new rms, which now face a lower stay cuto¤ in the Home destination. As the top right
graph shows, this decrease is a second-order e¤ect - the decrease in xHH over the range
of  is much less than the increases of xHF and
1

+HF1:
Insert Figure 3 here
As expected, increases in trade costs decrease the fraction of rms willing to test the
foreign market from a quarter of new rms at  = 1:1 to less than one percent at  = 1:9.
This decrease can be seen in the lower right graph of Figure 3. In the case of a plausible
 = 1:3; the model predicts that 14% of new rms test export markets. The percents
of exporters and export-only rms also decrease with increasing trade costs, with the
number of export-only rms hitting zero percent at a  = 1:5: The model predictions are
in line with the observed values in Table 3.
The domestic failure rate of new rms always stays above 90% in the bottom right of
Figure 3. The model suggests that the failure rates of new rms are underreported in the
literature. This may be due to a censoring issue: rms with very low demand draws may
never show up in the data, as they exit before reporting any sales.
The correlation of demands across destinations also matters for the predictions of the
model. The left hand side of Figure 3 illlustrates the e¤ects of varying  on the equilibrium.
The stay cuto¤s xHH and x

HF do not change considerably, but the testing cuto¤, which is
graphed as 1

+HF1; changes dramatically as  varies between 0 and 1: This occurs because
of two counteracting e¤ects. First, increasing  reduces the minimum domestic perceived
quality directly. To test the Foreign market, rm ! requires that xH! > 1
+
HF1: For a
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given +HF1; this cuto¤ obviously decreases with : However,  has an opposite e¤ect on
+HF1. As the demands in the two destinations become more and more correlated, rms
trust their domestic draws more. As seen in the conditional distribution 6, the expected
value of XF! get closer to the observed xH! as  increases. In addition, the variance
of XF! decreases; rms are more sure that xH! predicts XF!: This serves to move the
testing cuto¤ +HF1 closer to the stay cuto¤ x

HF : Since 
+
HF1 < x

HF ; this direction is
always positive. To see the convergence, imagine if  = 1: In this extreme case, rms that
tested in the Home market know exactly their perceived quality in the Foreign. They
would then only test the foreign market if xH! > xHF : The two e¤ects of  show up in
the top left graph: for low ; the rst e¤ect is stronger. As  gets closer to 1; the distance
between 1

+HF1 and x

HF must decrease in order to disappear at 1; so the second e¤ect
takes over.
These counteracting e¤ects of  show up in the fraction of rms that test and fail in the
destinations, as seen in the bottom left graph of Figure 3. The percentage of rms that
test the Foreign destination increases for low  and decreases for high ; as foreshadowed
by the path of 1

+HF1 the in top left graph. While x

HF does not change much, the percent
of rms that fail the foreign market drops from 95% to 75% as  increase from 0:1 to 0:9:
This reduction occurs mainly at the high end because as  increases, marginal rms with
low probabilities of export success are deciding not to export, leaving only those rms
with higher export stay probabilities.
As seen in the bottom left graph, values of  between 0.4 and 0.5 produce the highest
number of exporters, around 15%, when the decreasing failure rates of new exporters is
met by an increasing number of rms that begin to export. The model predictions are
in line with the observed values. The positive number of export-nly rms comes from
the fact that 1

+HF1 is below x

HH ;in the top left graph. In this case, rms that failed
the domestic market may still have incentives to export. Whether 1

+HF1 is below x

HH
depends on both  and  ; as seen in the two top gures. In fact, at  > 1:5, 1

+HF1 does
not dip below xHH for any value of :
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This exercise shows the power of the model to both reconcile old and new facts con-
cerning exporting, as well as provide counterfactuals showing the equilibrium e¤ects of
both trade costs and demand correlations across destinations.
4 Two Asymmetric Countries
Next I extend the baseline model to an economy of two assymetric countries. I show that
if one market is much larger than the other, all rms will test there rst.
We analyze the testing decisions of a new rm located in country i and introducing
the variety ! in time t: The rm has the same three testing strategies outlined in Sec-
tion 3.1 with the same functional forms. Proposition 2 still applies: no rm will test
both destinations simultaneously. However, in the assymetric case, it is not certain that
V i (SH;) > V i (SF;) in equilibrium. The order of the four stay cuto¤s is crucial to
determining equilibrium because by Lemma 1, they determine the strategies of the rms.
From Equation 7, we know xHF > x

FF and x

FH > x

HH : Therefore, the three possible
cuto¤ rankings are24
1. xFH > x

HH > x

HF > x

FF ;
2. xFH > x

HF = x

HH > x

FF ;
3. xFH > x

HF > x

HH > x

FF
If an equilibrium of type 3 occurs, the rms employ the same strategies as in the
symmetric country case: i.e. H rms employ S = SH and F rms employ S = SF: This
equilibrium is solved just as in the symmetric case above. By examining Equation 7, we
see that an equilibrium of type 2 occurs only in the very special case where YF
YH
=  1 F
H
:
As we will see, F
H
is bounded from above, so this equilibrium requires all parameters
;  ; ; s2; etc::to line up exactly for a given YF
YH
. This event occurs with zero probability,
so we do not discuss it further.
24There are also three additional possible rankings, which are mirror images of the three listed (Just
switch H and F ). Without loss of generalization, we consider only the listed three.
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All rms begin testing the same market Lets discuss the interesting equilibrium
of type 1: the rm faces lower stay cuto¤s in F than in H, no matter where the rm is
located. Testing is more protable in F; so all rms in both countries will employ strategy
S = SF: By Equation 7, this scenario exists only if
YF
YH
>  1
F
H
: (15)
That is, the scenario in which all rms test the Foreign destination rst occurs only
if the relative aggregate demand in the Foreign country is larger than the relative level
of competition , even for H rms that have to incur added exporting costs. Of course,
the level of competition depends on the size of the countries, and the relationship is not
linear. We can show that F
H
is bounded from above, and thus there exists an economy
where YF
YH
>  1 F
H
:
Proposition 5 There exists

YF
YH

such that in economies with

YF
YH

>

YF
YH

, all rms
will test F rst.
Proof. See Appendix.E
In this scenario, equilibrium is characterized by all rms testing the foreign market
rst. The demand for varieties in the foreign destination is so large that even rms in
H are willing to risk exporting rst. This may be the case for small countries exporting
to the US. Firms could start up in those countries with the sole purpose of selling to US
customers. Since  increases the upper bound, this scenario is less likely for further away
countries.
5 More than two Countries: Sequential Entry
I now examine predictions of my model for J > 2 symmetric countries with no trade
costs. Even without trade costs to discourage immediate exporting, I show that rms
will often expand their set of supply destinations one country at a time. The structure
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laid out in Section 2 remains the same, except I now restrict  ij = 1: Since there is
no di¤erence between the costs of supplying di¤erent destinations, the term "exporting"
is adjusted slightly. Therefore, I dene a rms rst destination to which it supplies
as its domestic destination, and any additional destinations as export destinations. For
exposition purposes, I consider a representative rm ! using the labor from country H
who has not yet supplied to any destinations in period t:
Given our multiple destination setup, rm ! has exponentially more testing strategies
than the three presented in Section 3.1. The rm can test up to J destinations in period
t. If it tests J   1 destinations in period t; it has two strategies for period t+ 1 : test or
dont test the last destination. If instead it tests J 2 destinations in period t; it has four
strategies for future periods: test zero, one, or both of remaining destinations in period
t + 1 and then, if it tests one in t + 1; then test or dont test the nal destination in
t+2. All in all, rm ! has 2J   1 total possible strategies it can pursue given J potential
destinations. We have to examine this problem recursively. In the beginning of each
period, the rm knows its state variables I! and I. The rm will choose K additional
destinations to test to maximize the lifetime testing prots in the remaining destinations.
I dene  (I!; I) as the recursive value function for rm !:
 (I!; I) = max
0<K<J I

Kvj (I!; I) + (1  )E


 
(I+K)!; I +K
	
(16)
Since all destinations are identical, ex ante, rms entering K new destinations choose
those K destinations randomly among the remaining J   I destinations. A recursive zero
prot steady state symmetric equilibrium is dened as the set of value functions ~ which
satisfy (16) and the aggregate state vector ~ which produces the initial value
~ (0; 0) = 0: (17)
That is, new rms have a zero expected value of introducing a new product.
In this equilibrium, some rms will choose K < J   I additional destinations each
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period. They do not immediately export to all remaining destinations, even though
these destinations are ex ante identical. I term this expansion sequential exporting. This
matches the pattern of export expansion described in Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout
(2007). I show this in a series of proofs.
Lemma 6 If a rm has a positive forecast for the expected testing prot, then its recursive
value function is positive:  (; I) > 08 > +jI :
Proof. The rm always has the option of testing all remaining J I destinations. Suppose
the rm has I! =  > 
+
HjI : Since vj (; I) > 0; then  (; I) > (J   I) vj (; I) > 0
If the rm owner expects positive prots in the remaining destinations, he can test
all of them this period. Since +HjI < 1; there is a mass o¤ rms that have a positive
recursive value function. However, it is not certain whether all these rms with I! > 
+
HjI
will test all remaining destinations. For the general case, we cannot determine whether
 (I!; I) = (J   I) vj (I!; I)8I! > +HjI . However, we at least know that all these
rms have positive recursive value functions. This is key because I can now show that
some rms with I! < 
+
HjI also have positive recursive value functions. These rms test
only a subset of remaining destinations.
Proposition 7 In any given period, there exist rms that will not test all remaining
destinations, but instead will test a subset of the remaining destinations. That is, 9 :
 (; I) > 0 > (J   1) vj (; I)
Proof. Consider rm ! having tested I destinations by period t and realizing a per-
ceived quality forecast of I! < 
+
HjI : Firm ! will not test all remaining destinations
because (J   I) vj (I!; I) < 0: However, suppose the rm takes the following strat-
egy: 1. test 1 additional destination j and obtain new perceived qualities xj!: 2. If
(I+1)! =
(I+(1 )I!+xj!)
(I+1)+1  > 
+
Hj(I+1); then test all remaining destinations. The lifetime
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value of this unique strategy is
1 (I!; I) = vj (I!; I) + (1  )	
	 =
1Z
+
Hj(I+1)
(J   I   1) vj (z; I + 1)h (zjI!; I) dz
where h (zjI!; I) is the probability that the random variable (I+1)! = z given I!; I
and K: By construction, 	 > 0: Since vj
 
+HjI ; I

= 0, vj (; I) < 08 < +HjI , and
dvj(;I)
d
> 0; there exists a cuto¤ I! such that 1 (; I) > 08 > I!: For those rms, we
can generate the following ranking:
 (I!; I)  1 (I!; I) >  (0j; I) = 0 > (J   1) vj (I!; I)8I! <  < +HjI :
Therefore, those rms with I! <  < 
+
HjI maximizes their recursive value functions by
testing at least one additional destination, but not all remaining destinations.
There are a mass of rms that, after testing I destinations, forecast negative life-
time prots in every remaining destination, so testing all remaining destination is not a
value-added strategy. However, some rms garner positive recursive value functions by
sequentially exporting in order to update their beliefs. Even if rms project failures in all
export destinations, the promise of future prot incentivises some of them to test at least
one additional destination. Since destinations are ex ante identical, the rm chooses its
next destination at random. Therefore, two rms with identical I! and I may choose
di¤erent destinations to test next.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I propose a model of heterogeneous rms that reconcile two new patterns
of trade: rms wait to export, and rms fail at exporting. To do so, I retool the standard
rm heterogeneity model to allow for imperfect correlation of rm heterogeneity across
destinations. This retooling endogenous the delay in exporting and the failures of ex-
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porters. When demand is imperfectly correlated across destinations, rms will use known
demands in tested destinations to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations.
Because the exporting success of a rm is not guaranteed by its domestic sales, this
model has di¤erent policy implications than the Melitz (2003) model. Policy makers
strictly adhering to Melitz (2003) would focus on getting the best domestic rms to
export. My model suggests that even the best domestic rms may be the worst exporting
rms, and vice versa. Policy makers should aim to get as many rms to test the foreign
market as possible, or help rms forecast foreign demands better.
This is a model of learning, as opposed to a model of evolution like the time-varying
productiivty models discussed in the introducation. Firms are static in the sense that
their destination-specic perceived qualities are time-invariant. In models of productivity
evolution, rms will receive their next period productivity shock no matter what they do.
In this model, rms make the endogenous choice whether to learn more about themselves.
Because this model is static, its predicted failure rate of rms in their rst period is much
higher than in later periods. An amalgam of this learning model and a productivity
evolution model would have rm heterogeneity change with time and destinations. This
amalgamation would smooth out the drop in hazard rate so that the model predictions
would more resemble that of Colombian rms. However, even without time-varying de-
mand, this model is able to endogenize the drop in hazard rates not seen in any other
model.
When faced with more than two possible destinations, rms will slowly expand their
set of export destinations to take advantage of this slow learning. Another extension
would heterogenize the demand correlations across destinations. This would make some
destinations more attractive than others. Even without an a priori ranking of destinations,
many rms will test a subset of untested destinations even though they forecast negative
prots in that destination. Firm owners know they have a tiny chance of success. But the
hope of future prots entices rms to enter destination markets even though they know
they will probably fail. This is the motivation for many new business ventures.
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APPENDICES
A Derivation: Moments of Xj!
The vector X! is normally distributed:
X!~NJ (0k;)
 = s2
26666664
1     
 1    
           
     1
:
37777775
The marginal distribution of any two elements can be described by Equation 5. Lets
partition X! by dening X! =

X1!; X
I
!

; with corresponding I+1 =
24 1 jI
Ij II
35 where
XI! = ~a is known and X
1
! is a single element. Greene (2008) shows that The conditional
distribution of X1! given X
I
! is normal with
E [Xj!jXI!] = jI 1II ~a
V AR[Xj!; XI!] = s
2   jI 1II Ij
It is simpler if we simplify jI 1II as done in Paltseva (2010).
jI
 1
II =
h
       
i
(1  ) (1 + (I   1) )
26666664
1 + (I   2)        
  1 + (I   2)      
           
       1 + (I   2) 
37777775
=

(1 + (I   1) )
h
1       1
i
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so that
jI
 1
II ~a =

PI
i=1 ai
(1 + (I   1) )
s2   jI 1II Ij = s2

1  I
2
(1 + (I   1) )

B Proof: A unique +ijI < x

ij exists for each ijI triplet
such that the expected testing prot is positive
only if  > +ijI
We need to rst show that dvijI()
d
> 0: Then we show that there exists a +ijI < x

ij such
that vijI
 
+ijI

= 0: Then we show that +ijI :
We can use the moments of truncated distributions in Greene (2008, p. 866-867) to
rewrite Equation 9 as
vijI () = f exp

+
2I
2
  xij

  f + (1  )

f# (18)
where
# =
1Z
xij
 
exp
 
x  xij
  1 gI (xj) dx:
Now, dvijI()
d
= f exp

+
2I
2
  xij

+ (1 )

f d#
d
: Since exp () > 0; we only have to show
that d#
d
> 0: Dene z = x 
I
: Now
# =
1Z
x
ij
 
I
 
exp
 
Iz +   xij
  1 (z) dz
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where  is the standard normal pdf. Now since Iz +   xij > 08z >
xij 
I
;
d#
d
=
1Z
x
ij
 
I
exp
 
Iz +   xij

 (z) dz > 0 (19)
We can plug in  = xij and    1 to show that vijI
 
xij

= f

exp

2I
2

  1

> 0
and lim! 1 vijI () =  f: Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a
+ijI < x

j such that vijI
 
+ijI

= 0: Since dvijI()
d
> 0; +ijI must be unique.
C Proof: The ranking of stay cuto¤s determines the
ranking of conditional values of testing.
Assume xiH > x

iF : We will show that   V i (SF;)  V i (SH;) > 0: First, take the
di¤erence between equations 14b and 14c:
 = 1 + (1  )2
1 = viF0 (0)  viH0 (0)
2 =
Z 1
1

+HF1
viF1 (x) g0 (x) dx 
Z 1
1

+HH1
viH1 (x) g0 (x) dx
To show that both 1 and 2 are positive, we need to show that
dvijI()
dxij
< 0: Using
the notation of Appendix B, we see that
dvijI ()
dxij
=  f exp

+
2I
2
  xij

  (1  )

f
1Z
xij
exp
 
x  xij

gI (xj) dx < 0:
The monotonicity of vijI with respect to xij ensures that if x

iH > x

iF ; then viF0 (0) 
viH0 (0) > 0: Thus 1 > 0:
The monotonicity of vijI with respect to both xij and  ensures x

iH > x

iF =) +iH1 >
+iF1: To show this, suppose by way of contradiction that x

iH > x

iF ; but 
+
iH1  +iF1:
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By construction, viF1
 
+iF1

= 0; and by the monotonicity of vijI with respect to xiF ;
viH1
 
+iF1

< 0: Since viH1
 
+iF1

< 0; dviH1()
d
> 0; and viH1
 
+iH1

= 0; +iH1 > 
+
iF1;
which is a contradiction.
Since +iH1 > 
+
iF1; we can rewrite 2 as
2 =
Z 1
1

+iH1
(viF1 (x)  viH1 (x)) g0 (x) dx+
Z 1

+iF1
1

+iH1
viH1 (x) g0 (x) dx (20)
Since we have shown that viF1 (x)  viH1 (x) > 0; and viH1 (x) > 0 for x > 1+iH1;
it is easy to see that 2 > 0:
D Proof: There exists a unique steady state equilib-
rium
By symmetry, V H (SH;) = V F (SF;) : Here I show that V H (SH;) = 0 for a single
 = ~: By rearranging equation 7, I can dene j as a function of xHH :
j (x

HH) =
exp (xHH) p
1 
Hj Y
f
(21)
. Likewise, xF ; 
+
ijI ; and 
+
ijI are all subsequently dened by x

HH : I can then redene
V (xHH)  V (SH;) as
V (xHH) = V (SH;(x

HH)) = V

SH;
 
j (x

HH) ; x

ij (x

HH) ; 
+
ijI (x

HH)

i2fH Fg;j2fH;Fg;I2f0;1g

(22)
since xHH su¢ ciently characterizes all market variables in the set : Therefore, proving
that V (xHH) = 0 for a single x

HH = ~x is su¢ cient. Which is what I will do, via the
intermediate value theorem.
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Part 1: V (xHH < 0) > 0 Using equations 14b and 8, I can decompose V (x

HH) :
V (xHH) = Va (x

HH) + Vb (x

HH) + Vc (x

HH)
Va (x

HH) =
1Z
 1
HHt (u) g0 (uj0) du

xHH
Vb (x

HH) =
1  

1Z
xHH
HHt (u) g0 (uj0) du

xHH
Vc (x

HH) = (1  )
Z 1
+
HF1

vHF1 (u) g0 (uj0) du

xHH
:
By construction, Vb (x) > 0; Vc (x) > 0: Keeping in mind that ; xF ; x
+
H ; and x
+
F are all
functions of xHH ; I can rewrite of Va (x

HH) as
Va (x

HH) = f exp

s2
2
  xHH

  f
If xHH < 0; V (x

HH) =
Va (x

HH) +
Vb (x

HH) +
Vc (x

HH) > 0:
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Part 2: limxH!1
V (xHH) < 0: Now I show that V (x

HH) is negative at large, positive
values of xHH : :
lim
xHH!1
Va (x

HH) = lim
xHH!1
f exp

s2
2
  xHH

  f =  f
lim
xHH!1
Vb (x

HH) = lim
xHH!1
1  

1Z
xHH
Ht (u) g0 (uj0) du = 0
lim
xHH!1
Vc (x

HH) = lim
xHH!1
(1  )
Z 1
+
HF1

vHF1 (u) g0 (uj0) du = 0:
It is straightforward to see that the limxHH!1
V (xHH) =  f < 0:
25In fact, the last equation showing Va (xHH) implies that, in order to satisfy our zero prot condition,
the equilibrium xHH must be greater than
s2
2 !:
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Part 3. V (xHH) is decreasing with x

HH : First:
@ Va
@xHH
=  f exp

s2
2
  xHH

< 0
The derivative of Vb requires Leibnitzs Rule:
@ Vb
@xHH
=  1  

0B@Ht (xHH) g0 (xHH j0) + fexp (xHH)
1Z
xHH
exp (u) g0 (uj0) du
1CA :
Since Ht (xHH) = 0; and
1Z
xHH
exp (u) g0 (uj0) du > 0 by construction,
@ Vb
@xHH
=  (1  )

f
exp (xHH)
1Z
xHH
exp (u) g0 (uj0) du
< 0
We can also use Leibnitzs rule to nd @ Vc
@xHH
:
@ Vc
@xHH
=   (1  )
 
vHF1
 
+HF1

g0
 
+HF1j0
 d+HF1
dXH
 
Z 1
+
HF1

@vHF1 (u)
@xHH
g0 (uj0) du
!
Again, vHF1
 
+HF1

= 0, so we now have
@ Vc
@xHH
= (1  )
Z 1
+
HF1

@vHF1 (u)
@xHH
g0 (uj0) du:
Now, I need to decompose @vHF1(u)
@xHH
into current period expected prots and expect future
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prots:
@vHF1 (u)
@xHH
=
@vHF11 (u)
@xHH
+
@vHF12 (u)
@xHH
vHF11 (u) =
1Z
 1
HF (u) g0 (uj0) du
vHF12 (u) =
1  

1Z
xHF
HF (u) g1 (ujx) du:
Following exactly our procedure to nd @ Va
@xHH
and @
Vb
@xHH
; We can nd @vHF1(u)
@xHH
< 0, which
makes @ Vc
@xHH
< 0: I then combine all three so that
@ V
@xHH
=
@ Va
@xHH
+
@ Vb
@xHH
+
@ Vc
@xHH
< 0: (23)
The intermediate value theorem Since V (xHH < 0) > 0, limxHH!1
V (xHH) =
 f < 0; and V (xHH) is decreasing over that range.The intermediate value theorem
states that there exists a unique ~x such that V (xHH) = 0 i¤ x

HH = ~x:
E Derivation: Country Size Cuto¤
YF and YH are exogenous parameters of the model, so YFYH 2 (0;1) : We will show that
there exists a su¢ cient cuto¤ F;UB
H;LB
such that F
H
<
F;UB
H;LB
. Therefore, there exists
YF
YH

=  1 F;UB
H;LB
such that if YF
YH
>

YF
YH

; YF
YH
> F
H
:
First, we can dene F;UB; an upper bound for F : Since all rms test F rst, the
level of competition in F is
F = MFp
1 
FF
 Z 1
 1
exp (x) g (x) dx+
1  

Z 1
xFF
exp (x) g0 (x; 0) dx
!
+MHp
1 
HF
 Z 1
 1
exp (x) g (x) dx+
1  

Z 1
xHF
exp (x) g0 (x; 0) dx
!
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where Mj is the mass of new varieties from country j each period. By noticing that
p1 HF < p
1 
FF , we can show that
F < F;UB = p
1 
FF (MF +MH)
1

exp

s2
2

:
Similarly. We can dene a lower bound for H : Only rms that obtain anXF! > 1
+
iH1
will test the H destination. Therefore, the level of competition in H is
H = MFp
1 
FF (1  )
Z 1
1

+FH1
0@ R1 1 exp (z) g1 (zjx) dz
+1 

R1
xFH
exp (z) g1 (zjx) dz
1A g (x) dx
+MHp
1 
HF (1  )
Z 1
1

+HH1
0@ R1 1 exp (z) g1 (zjx) dz
+1 

R1
xHH
exp (z) g1 (zjx; 1) dz
1A g (x) dx
and we can dene a lower bound for it:
H >
 
MFp
1 
HF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  )
Z 1
1

+FH1
Z 1
 1
exp (z) g1 (zjx) dz

g (x) dx:
Using the properties of the lognormal, we nd that
1Z
 a
exp (u) g (zjx; 1) dz = exp (x)
Z 1
 a
exp

z
p
(1  2)

g (z) dz
= exp (x) exp

(1  2) s2
2


 
1  2 s  a
s

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and use that results to continute manipulating the inequality:
H >
 
MFp
1 
FF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  )
Z 1
1

+H1
exp (x) exp

(1  2) s2
2

g (x) dx
>
 
MFp
1 
FF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  ) exp

(1  2) s2
2
Z 1
1

+H1
exp (x) g (x) dx
>
 
MFp
1 
FF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  ) exp

(1  2) s2
2

exp

2s2
2


 
1  2 s  +H1
s

>
 
MFp
1 
FF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  ) exp

s2
2


 
1  2 s  +H1
s

>
 
MFp
1 
FF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  ) exp

s2
2


 
1  2 s  xHH
s

(24)
We need to substitute in for the endogenous xHH : From the proof to Proposition 2,
we know 0 > vHH0 (0). Therefore,
0 > vHH0 (0) = f
0BBBBBB@
1Z
 1
exp
 
x  xj

g (x) dx  1
+ (1 )

1Z
xj
 
exp
 
x  xj
  1 g (x) dx
1CCCCCCA
= f
0@ exp s22   xHH  1 + (1 ) exp s22   xHH
  (1 )



s  xHH
s

1A
exp

s2
2
  xHH

>  + (1  ) 

s  x

HH
s

exp

s2
2
  xHH

  
(1  ) > 

s  x

HH
s

exp

s2
2
  xHH

> 
s2
2
  xHH > ln  
1  2 s  xHH
s
>
ln 
s
+
 
1  2 s  s
2
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We can plug this result into Inequality 24 to dene
H > H;LB =
 
MFp
1 
HF +MHp
1 
HF

(1  ) exp

s2
2



ln 
s
+
 
1  2 s  s
2

Now we know that
F
H
<
F;UB
H;LB
=
 1
 (1  )    ln 
s
+ (1  2) s  s
2
 (25)
If YF
YH
>  1 F;UB
H;LB
; then it certainly satises Condition 15. Therefore, we can dene a
su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium of type 1 :
YF
YH
>
 2 2
 (1  )    ln 
s
+ (1  2) s  s
2
 (26)
)
YF
YH
>  1
F
H
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